The US/Israel–Iran war is already reshaping governance across the Middle East, not only through battlefield outcomes but through the expanded use of emergency powers. This analysis by ISSE Senior Fellow Paul Shaya examines how Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon are leveraging crisis conditions to enact political and institutional changes that extend beyond immediate security needs. In Israel, wartime procedures have enabled the passage of controversial legislation under reduced scrutiny, raising concerns about democratic oversight. Jordan has used the conflict to tighten restrictions on speech, media, and public assembly, reinforcing existing limits on civic space. Lebanon, by contrast, has invoked extraordinary measures to challenge Hizballah’s parallel authority and reassert state sovereignty. Together, these cases illustrate a broader pattern central to ISSE’s work: emergencies can create openings for durable shifts in governance that may outlast the crises that justified them.

Hungary’s upcoming election offers more than a test of electoral competition, it provides a vantage point for assessing a system shaped over time through the sustained integration of emergency powers. Under Viktor Orbán, successive crises including migration, COVID-19, and the aftermath of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, have enabled the expansion and normalization of executive authority. This article adopts the concept of “exceptionality,” developed in recent scholarship by Przemyslaw Tacik and Gian-Giacomo Fusco, to describe how emergency-derived powers persist beyond formal declarations and become embedded in ordinary governance. Drawing on Kim Lane Scheppele’s analysis in the Journal of Democracy, it situates Hungary’s electoral dynamics within a broader restructuring of the political and legal environment. Elections continue, but the conditions under which they occur have been systematically redefined. The coming vote provides a baseline from which to evaluate how such a system operates in practice, and how it may evolve in the period that follows.

This Lawfare U.S.-based analysis compiles a nationwide dataset of more than 300 immigration habeas cases in which federal authorities failed to comply with court orders. While courts generally succeed in securing eventual compliance, the cases reveal recurring patterns, such as delayed releases, unauthorized transfers, and failures to justify detention, that require repeated judicial intervention to enforce legal limits. Situated within a broader framework of sustained emergency authorities and expanded enforcement activity, these dynamics point to structural strain within the system of legal oversight.

Viewed in aggregate, the dataset suggests not a breakdown of legality, but a shift in how it operates in practice. Individuals remain formally protected by law, yet the realization of those protections often depends on administrative action and continued judicial enforcement. This pattern also raises questions about the limits of judicial enforcement itself, and whether repeated, low-consequence noncompliance risks becoming normalized over time. For ISSE, these dynamics highlight how prolonged reliance on emergency frameworks may contribute to the emergence of exception-like practices within routine governance.

A new impeachment filing in the United States places emergency powers at the center of a constitutional dispute over executive authority. Introduced by Congressman John B. Larson, the resolution includes allegations that emergency authorities have been used by the U.S. President to bypass congressional processes and expand executive reach. Section 12 focuses specifically on how these powers are invoked and applied in practice. This article analyzes those claims within the broader framework of U.S. emergency powers law. It considers what sustained reliance on such authorities may mean for institutional balance.

Two recent White House memoranda responding to the DHS shutdown rely on existing appropriations law to justify paying federal employees despite a lapse in funding. While the directives do not invoke formal emergency powers, they explicitly frame the situation as a national security emergency and use that rationale to support a flexible reading of statutory limits, raising questions under the Antideficiency Act and the core rule that funds must be used only as appropriated. Legally, presidential memoranda can carry the same force as executive orders, placing the focus on interpretation rather than form. The result is a form of constrained executive improvisation that remains within the language of the law while testing its boundaries. From an ISSE perspective, this reflects a broader shift: emergency reasoning migrating into routine administrative practice. Repeated over time, such approaches risk normalizing flexible statutory interpretation as a substitute for legislative resolution.

The New York City Bar Association’s March 2026 report entitled “The Crisis Deepens: Congress Must Act Now to Address Escalating Abuses of Executive Power“ marks a shift from identifying executive overreach to documenting a more systemic pattern of governance beyond meaningful legal constraint. Building on its December 2025 report entitled “The Abuse of Presidential Power and Breach of the Public Trust,” which warned of boundary-testing, this follow-up argues those boundaries are now being operationally redefined. The report highlights the use of coercive, emergency-style practices without formal invocation of emergency powers, reflecting a broader ISSE concern with embedded exceptionalism. At the same time, weakening judicial enforcement and limited congressional response risk enabling further expansion. The cumulative effect represents a transformation in how law functions in practice. What emerges is a pattern of normalized exceptionalization, where the line between ordinary governance and emergency rule becomes increasingly indistinct.

The U.S. Helsinki Commission issued a formal statement on March 18, 2026, entitled “Bipartisan Helsinki Commission Leadership issue Statement on OSCE Report on Human Rights Abuses in Georgia,” condemning Georgia’s systemic abuse of emergency‑like legislative powers and urging U.S. sanctions to compel compliance with international recommendations. This marks an explicit, bipartisan U.S. government acknowledgment that Georgia is leveraging emergency‑style laws to consolidate political control and suppress democratic opposition. The call for sanctions signals rising international pressure and potential policy movement if Georgia fails to reverse course.

PORT-OF-SPAIN, Trinidad (AP) — Trinidad and Tobago declared a new state of emergency on March 3, 2026, only about a month after the end of the previous one, as authorities in the Caribbean nation continue to grapple with high levels of violent crime.

Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar cited credible reports of attacks planned against law enforcement officers in reimposing the emergency, which grants the government additional powers, including to make arrests and conduct searches without warrants.

Trinidad and Tobago has spent roughly 10 of the last 14 months under an emergency, with the last one ending January 31, 2026.

Bissessar said the country’s National Security Council has noted that ongoing crime has led to “multiple deaths due to mass shootings and that the continuance of reprisal shootings amongst criminal gangs, if left unchecked, would endanger public safety.”

The state of emergency has an initial duration of up to 15 days, but the government can extend it if needed. Government officials did not immediately announce any plans for a curfew.

Trinidad and Tobago’s government then, on March 13, 2026, received House of Representatives approval to extend the state of emergency for three months.

The two motions to extend the measure, which grants the government additional powers, including to make arrests and conduct searches without warrants, were approved in a 26-12 vote late Friday. There were no abstentions.

When Trinidad and Tobago declared yet another state of emergency (SoE) last week, it marked the ninth time since the country gained Independence in 1962 that a public declaration of emergency has been used to confront national challenges.

Sweeping emergency powers that suspend constitutional rights were once used sparingly for reasons ranging from social unrest to threats to its democracy. But more recently, the SoE has been used as a tool to deal with the problem of gang violence and crime.

Over the last five years—between 2021 and 2026—a total of four states of emergency have been declared.

According to Section 8 of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago, the President may declare an SoE if he/she is satisfied that a public emergency has arisen as a result of the imminence of a “State of War” between T&T and a foreign state, the occurrence of disaster or other calamity, or threats to endanger the public safety.

Historically, the use of emergency powers were invoked to quell disturbances, notably during the Black Power Movement of the 1970s, and the 1990 attempted coup that saw the Prime Minister and ministers taken hostage in the Parliament by armed members of the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen. Since then it has been used for public health purposes, and a variety of others.

On March 3, 2026, the Government of Trinidad and Tobago reimposed a state of emergency following a resurgence of gang-related violence, including intelligence indicating imminent reprisal killings and coordinated attacks. Acting on the advice of the National Security Council, the Prime Minister invoked constitutional emergency provisions, with the President formally proclaiming the emergency effective immediately. The decision followed an earlier state of emergency (July 2025–January 2026), during which authorities reported significant reductions in crime through intelligence-led operations targeting organized criminal networks.

Officials framed the renewed declaration as a necessary response to escalating threats that exceeded the capacity of ordinary law enforcement tools, emphasizing a “zero tolerance” approach to gang activity and the protection of state institutions. At the same time, the government highlighted both the operational successes of prior emergency measures and the limits of legislative reforms intended to sustain those gains under normal legal conditions.

Five years after the 2021 coup, Myanmar presents a critical case for understanding how emergency powers evolve beyond their original justification. What began as a constitutionally framed state of emergency has developed into a durable and contested system of governance, where the line between exceptional and ordinary rule has blurred. Recent efforts to reconvene parliament under military-aligned conditions highlight attempts to restore institutional form while leaving underlying questions of legitimacy unresolved. At the same time, competing claims between the junta and a government-in-exile underscore a deeper fragmentation of sovereignty that international law has yet to reconcile. This analysis examines how emergency authority in Myanmar has moved from temporary invocation to embedded order, reshaping the structure of governance itself.

On February 20, 2026, the Supreme Court issued its decision in the consolidated tariffs cases, Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump and Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc., holding 6–3 that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorize the President to impose tariffs. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that although IEEPA grants broad authority to regulate economic transactions during declared national emergencies, it does not include the distinct power to levy tariffs or duties — authorities constitutionally assigned to Congress under Article I. The Court further held that the Major Questions Doctrine applies even in the context of emergency statutes addressing foreign affairs, and that Congress must speak clearly if it intends to delegate tariff-setting authority of such vast economic and political significance. Because IEEPA contains no explicit reference to tariffs or duties, the challenged “Liberation Day” and reciprocal tariffs were deemed unlawful.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump blocks the use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to impose tariffs, drawing an important statutory boundary around executive emergency authority. But the ruling turns on textual limits, not on scrutiny of the underlying emergency itself. As a result, while the Court prevented one expansion of presidential power, it left intact the broader architecture through which emergency declarations can accumulate authority over time. The case illustrates a central tension in contemporary governance: judicial intervention may constrain specific statutory overreach, even as the structural normalization of emergency power continues.

Former South Korean president Yoon Suk Yeol has been sentenced to life imprisonment after the Seoul Central District Court found him guilty of leading an insurrection stemming from his December 3, 2024 declaration of martial law. The court concluded that his deployment of military and police forces against the National Assembly constituted an unlawful attempt to subvert the constitutional order, citing evidence that troops were ordered to blockade parliament and detain senior political leaders. Prosecutors had sought the death penalty, but the court imposed life imprisonment with hard labor, emphasizing the gravity of the societal and institutional harm caused. Several senior security and defense officials were also convicted and received lengthy prison terms. The ruling marks one of the most consequential judicial responses to executive overreach in South Korea’s democratic history, with additional legislative efforts underway to bar future presidential pardons for insurrection.

In January 2026, Guatemala invoked a 30-day state of siege after prison riots and coordinated attacks linked to the transnational gang Barrio 18 left 11 police officers dead. Ratified by Congress, the measure temporarily expanded police and military authority and was followed by a nationwide state of prevention once the siege expired. Government officials reported substantial security gains, including arrests, major drug seizures, and reductions in extortion and homicide. This analysis considers the episode through the framework of the state of exception, examining how constitutional democracies authorize extraordinary powers in moments of crisis and how those powers, even when formally time-bound, illuminate the delicate line between safeguarding public order and redefining the contours of ordinary law.

On February 20, the Supreme Court ruled that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, known as IEEPA, does not authorize President Trump’s sweeping tariffs. In Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, and the consolidated case, the Court held that the statute does not grant the President the power to impose tariffs under a declaration of economic emergency. In this podcast episode from the National Constitution Center, we explore what the Court held, why the Justices disagreed about the reasoning, and what this decision might tell us about the future of presidential emergency power. To help us explore these questions are two leading Court watchers and constitutional experts, Zachary Shemtob of SCOTUSblog and Ilya Somin of the George Mason University. Julie Silverbrook, vice president of civic education of the National Constitution Center, moderates.

South Korea’s former president, Yoon Suk Yeol, has been sentenced to life imprisonment after a failed six-hour declaration of martial law in December 2024 led to his conviction for insurrection. Although martial law is constitutionally permitted under certain emergency conditions, the move was widely seen as an extreme response to domestic political pressures and triggered deep national polarization. His arrest, prosecution, and sentencing nevertheless unfolded through established legal processes, demonstrating the resilience of South Korea’s democratic institutions. The episode offers a stark case study in how emergency powers can be invoked, contested, and ultimately constrained within a constitutional system.

On January 29, 2026, U.S. President Donald J. Trump signed an Executive Order titled “Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Cuba,” declaring that the current geopolitical dynamics involving Cuba constitute an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to U.S. national security and foreign policy, and as such further constitute a formal national emergency under the National Emergencies Act (NEA) and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).

This explainer situates the declaration within the broader framework of U.S. emergency powers, outlining the legal authorities invoked and the mechanisms through which the order is intended to be implemented. ISSE’s analysis focuses on clarifying how this emergency functions in practice, what it enables as a matter of law, and why its invocation matters in the context of the growing normalization of emergency authorities in U.S. governance. The piece is intended to provide readers with a clear, accessible account of the declaration itself and its immediate implications, rather than a normative assessment of U.S.-Cuba policy.

For United States President Donald Trump, 2025 was a year of crisis.

Roaring into office on January 20 on the heels of a raucous political comeback, the president’s own telling describes a series of actions that have been swift and stark.

To name a few, he has envisioned rooting out a migrant “invasion” that includes staunching legal immigrants, and, potentially, targeting US citizens; he has touted a hard reset of uneven trade deals that pose “an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security”; and, in the final months of the year, he has gone on the military offensive against “narcoterrorists” that he claims seek to topple the US through illicit drugs, possibly used as “weapons of mass destruction”.

For legal observers, Trump’s approach has been a yet-undecided stress test on presidential power, cranked by the gears of broadly interpreted emergency statutes and untrammeled executive authority.

Decisions by the court, lawmakers and voters in the 2026 midterm elections could determine how that strategy resonates or is restrained.

“The use or abuse of emergency powers is only one corner of a larger picture,” Frank Bowman, professor emeritus of law at the University of Missouri, told Al Jazeera.

“In many cases, the administration is simply doing stuff that certainly any pre-existing understandings of executive authority would have said you cannot do,” he said.

While public attention has recently focused on events in Venezuela and the ICE killing of Renee Good in Minneapolis, two court decisions issued shortly before Christmas (one by a federal district court and one by the Supreme Court) warrant closer scrutiny. In each case, the judiciary imposed at least temporary limits on the current administration’s assertion of extraordinary executive authority. Although neither arose from a formally declared state of emergency, both reflect an expansive conception of presidential power in which certain actions are treated as categorically insulated from judicial review.

In this respect, the cases illustrate how exceptional power may be exercised without explicit invocation of emergency authorities, not by suspending the law temporarily, but by asserting that entire domains of executive action lie beyond ordinary legal constraint. This mode of governance closely aligns with the most maximalist contours of unitary executive theory and functions as a de facto state of exception embedded within constitutional interpretation itself.