Five years after President Kais Saied invoked emergency powers and suspended Tunisia’s parliament, this article examines the country’s subsequent shift toward concentrated executive rule, political repression, international isolation, and economic vulnerability. It also considers how the United States and Europe might reengage Tunisia and support reform while confronting the lasting institutional consequences of a state of exception that evolved into a broader transformation of constitutional governance.

The Brennan Center’s Joseph Nunn examines the prolonged deployment of National Guard forces in Washington, D.C., arguing that the more significant constitutional issue is not the initial invocation of emergency authority but the normalization of a sustained military role in civilian governance. The article explores broader questions about the temporal limits of emergency powers, the domestic use of military forces, and the constitutional risks that arise when exceptional measures become part of ordinary government practice.

Janos Mark Szakolczai examines how information generated during seemingly ordinary or peaceful conditions can become a latent instrument of coercion, surveillance, and warfare when political circumstances change. Drawing on the concept of capta, Agamben’s state of exception, and examples ranging from the Prague Spring to contemporary AI-enabled security systems, the article explores how exceptional powers can become embedded in enduring data infrastructures long after the circumstances that produced them have changed.

Drawing on Poland's own experience recovering from democratic backsliding, investigative journalist Wojciech Cieśla examines the institutional challenges Hungary faces following the end of Viktor Orbán's sixteen years in power. The article explores the difficult process of rebuilding courts, media, and constitutional institutions after prolonged executive consolidation, offering important insights into how democracies recover from periods of exceptional governance.

This article by ISSE Research Fellow Yuvraj Tuli, published in Just Security, examines how courts should distinguish between legitimate national security judgments and the use of national security authorities as a pretext for unrelated political or administrative objectives. It explores when judicial deference to executive claims of national security is warranted, and when constitutional accountability requires more searching judicial review.

The Roman statesman Cincinnatus has long symbolized the constitutional principle that extraordinary powers should be exercised only when genuinely necessary and relinquished once the crisis has passed. His enduring legacy illustrates one of the oldest and most important safeguards of constitutional government: that emergency authority derives its legitimacy not only from necessity, but from its temporary character.

The EMERGE Project at Ghent University examines how emergency powers have shaped European constitutional orders, legal institutions, and political cultures over the past century, challenging the assumption that emergencies leave no lasting constitutional legacy. The project demonstrates how exceptional governance can become embedded within ordinary legal systems, offering important historical context for understanding the evolution and normalization of emergency powers today.

In this discussion hosted by the American Enterprise Institute, John Yoo, William Galston, and Ilya Somin examine competing constitutional theories of executive power, separation of powers, independent agencies, war powers, and the original understanding of Article II against the backdrop of major Supreme Court cases concerning the unitary executive. The panel explores enduring questions about the constitutional limits of presidential authority and how competing interpretations of executive power continue to shape American constitutional governance.

This analysis by Ashleigh Maciolek at the Brennan Center for Justice examines the Supreme Court's increasing reliance on its emergency, or "shadow," docket, noting that for the first time the Court resolved more substantive matters through expedited emergency procedures than through its traditional merits docket. Particularly relevant to ISSE's work, the article raises broader questions about how institutional procedures originally designed for exceptional circumstances can gradually become normalized within ordinary constitutional governance.

In this Lawfare essay, George Croner examines recent court decisions addressing presidential authority to federalize the National Guard and considers what those rulings may mean for future invocations of the Insurrection Act, arguing that courts retain a critical role in reviewing whether presidents have satisfied the statutory conditions necessary to exercise extraordinary domestic emergency powers. The article explores how judicial oversight can serve as an important safeguard against the expansion and normalization of exceptional executive authority within ordinary constitutional governance.

Following nearly thirty-eight years of martial law, Taiwan undertook a decades-long process of reforming its security institutions while continuing to confront significant external security threats. This study demonstrates how constitutional systems can restore democratic oversight, civilian control, and institutional accountability after prolonged periods of exceptional governance, offering an important perspective on the long-term process of democratic recovery from emergency rule.

Drawing on more than three decades of comparative evidence, this report argues that democratic governance strengthens national security by reinforcing institutional resilience, public trust, accountability, and effective crisis response, challenging the assumption that security requires weaker democratic constraints. The report provides an evidence-based framework for understanding how constitutional guardrails and democratic oversight contribute to long-term security while helping prevent the normalization of extraordinary executive authority.

Kate Gilbert examines how the Department of Justice’s report uses the language of ordinary bureaucracy to frame extraordinary political claims. The article raises questions central to ISSE’s work: how exceptional political logics become embedded within routine democratic governance and how expansive interpretations of Unitary Executive Theory may reshape democratic governance. 

How can the most expansive forms of the unitary executive theory function as a standing state of exception within constitutional law? ISSE puts the recent legal disputes over the revocation of security clearances and the attempted federalization of National Guard within a deeper theory of presidential power. 

How has the use of presidential “czars” undermined Congress and the Constitution?  Dr. Mark J. Rozell discusses his newest book “Unitary Executive Theory: A Danger to Constitutional Government.”

Examining the Supreme Court’s consideration of the Trump v. Slaughter case, Peter J. Wallison argues that permitting presidents to remove officials from independent regulatory agencies without a cause would fundamentally alter the balance between Congress and the executive branch. Relevant to ISSE’s work, Wallison warns that subtle judicial reinterpretations of constitutional structure over time accumulate excessive concentrations of executive power.

Contrary to the “Decision of 1789” myth, history shows that the first Congress rejected the exclusive unitary model of the presidency—and thus the presidential removal power should be subject to more congressional control than recent Supreme Court decisions have held.

Human Rights Watch’s analysis of Hungary highlights how emergency powers have become embedded in the country’s political system. Under Viktor Orbán, who was voted out of office in April 2026, crisis-driven authorities have evolved into durable tools for governing, shaping media, institutions, and electoral competition. Rather than temporary measures, emergency frameworks have been renewed and repurposed across migration, pandemic, and security contexts. Weak domestic and external constraints have allowed these powers to persist with limited oversight. For ISSE, Hungary illustrates the normalization of exceptionality, where extraordinary powers become a routine feature of democratic governance.

An international panel of legal experts has concluded that serious human rights violations committed under El Salvador’s ongoing state of emergency may constitute crimes against humanity. The report examines allegations including arbitrary detention, torture, enforced disappearances, sexual violence, and persecution carried out as part of the government’s security policy since March 2022. Beyond documenting abuses, the study argues that the prolonged state of exception has weakened democratic safeguards, eroded separation of powers, and concentrated authority within the executive branch. The report also calls for independent case review mechanisms and greater international accountability efforts. For ISSE, the findings highlight the long-term institutional risks posed by entrenched emergency governance.

A surge in executive “emergency” actions is reshaping the balance of power in the United States. This analysis finds that the scale, pace, and scope of recent emergency orders, particularly outside traditional frameworks like International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), are historically unprecedented and increasingly directed toward domestic policy goals. The use of declarations such as the “National Energy Emergency” illustrates how emergency authorities can be leveraged to bypass Congress and statutory constraints. With legislative checks weakened since INS v. Chadha and judicial review often limited, meaningful oversight is increasingly difficult. The piece from Lawfare argues that courts may need to adopt more searching review to prevent the normalization, and weaponization, of emergency powers.