Greetings! It is with deep humility and a strong sense of purpose that I formally welcome you to the Institute for the Study of States of Exception (ISSE). ISSE is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing scholarship and dialogue on the misuse and abuse of states of exception worldwide–scenarios when laws or even entire constitutions are suspended under purported emergency circumstances, but in reality are intentionally framed improperly to enable democratic backsliding.

On August 29, 2025, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a May 2025 decision by the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT) in V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. United States, which had held in favor of the plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgement, and determining that U.S. President Donald Trump’s use of emergency powers under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose sweeping tariffs was unlawful. While affirming the CIT’s decision, the Federal Circuit did however pause its ruling from taking effect until October 14, 2025, allowing tariffs to remain in place while the Trump administration seeks relief from the U.S. Supreme Court to reverse the decision. Indeed on September 02, 2025, President Trump told reporters at the White House that he would seek an “expedited ruling” from the U.S. Supreme Court to overturn this decision. Given the doctrinal importance of the case, especially its implications for emergency powers, non-delegation, and the Major Questions Doctrine, it is likely that the Court would grant certiorari…

This book addresses the relevance of the state of exception for the analysis of law, while reflecting on the deeper symbolic and jurisprudential significance of the coalescence between law and force.

The concept of the state of exception has become a central topos in political and legal philosophy as well as in critical theory. The theoretical apparatus of the state of exception sharply captures the uneasy relationship between law, life and politics in the contemporary global setting, while also challenging the comforting narratives that uncritically connect democracy with the tradition of the rule of law. Drawing on critical legal theory, continental jurisprudence, political philosophy and history, this book explores the genealogy of the concept of the state of exception and reflects on its legal embodiment in past and present contexts – including Weimar and Nazi Germany, contemporary Europe and Turkey. In doing so, it explores the disruptive force of the exception for legal and political thought, as it recuperates its contemporary critical potential…

In this episode of “It’s the Law,” UC Berkeley School of Law Dean Erwin Chemerinsky breaks down the answer and explains that the Constitution is meant to limit what the government can do, and those limits apply to emergencies as well…

On 11 August 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump declared a crime emergency in the District of Columbia, placing the D.C. police department under federal control, and deploying the District of Columbia National Guard within the city. The White House also concurrently directed Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth to coordinate with State Governors to authorize the orders of any additional members of other states’ National Guards to active service, as deemed necessary and appropriate to augment the President’s intent…

A week ago, President Donald Trump and members of his cabinet announced a takeover of law enforcement functions in Washington, D.C. using three tools: deployment of elements of the D.C. National Guard (and National Guard troops from several cooperating states as well), invocation of a statutory emergency power to requisition the services of the city’s Metropolitan Police Department, and a surge of federal law enforcement to the city’s streets, including Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other federal agents. Over the past week, 800 D.C. National Guardsmen have been mobilized for operations in the city, with hundreds more state National Guardsmen on their way, and 500 newly deployed immigration and other federal agents are patrolling the streets or have set up checkpoints. At the same time, the district and the White House have engaged in a power struggle over control of the city’s police department…

National emergencies are critical tools for addressing sudden and unforeseen events — often situations that require an immediate, decisive response to address. In our constitutional system, a national emergency declaration allows the president to temporarily use certain authorities that Congress has previously approved. Congress delegated this authority to the president because it sometimes cannot act quickly enough to respond to certain kinds of situations, such as natural disasters and public health emergencies. Upon declaring a national emergency, over 130 special authorities — such as the authority to shut down communications facilities or draw down equipment from national defense stockpiles— are immediately unlocked that enable a president to intervene in ways that are unavailable to them outside of an emergency declaration.

If you want to learn about economic sanctions, which are the most common of the president’s emergency powers, and one non-conflict way to exert pressure on a foreign power, check out New Hampshire Public Radio’s Civics 101 podcast episode on emergency powers. You’ll also learn about certain military powers the president has under an emergency declaration. Emergency powers are designed for when plans need to change, and fast, by allowing the president to override certain Constitutional provisions in a time of crisis. But in the last century, national emergencies have gone from a rarity to a tool that presidents use dozens of times while in office. We talk about what a president can (and cannot) do during a state of emergency, and how Congress has tried to put checks on that power, with help from Kim Lane Scheppele, author of Law in a Time of Emergency…

Emergency powers have existed in countries around the world for centuries. Their purpose is simple: to temporarily enhance executive power during unexpected crises that are moving too fast for Congress to respond. The Brennan Center’s original research cataloged 123 statutory authorities that become available to the president when he declares a national emergency. Many are measured and sensible, but others seem like the stuff of authoritarian regimes: giving the president the power to take over domestic communications, seize Americans’ bank accounts, and deploy U.S. troops to any foreign country. Given how broad these powers are, it is critical to have adequate safeguards in place to prevent abuse…

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the ensuing “war on terrorism” brought to center stage issues that have previously lurked in a dark corner at the edge of the legal universe, such as how a constitutional regime should respond to violent challenges. This question is as ancient as the Roman Republic and as new as the realities wrought by the terrorist attacks of September 11th. It has faced nations embroiled in wars against external enemies, as well as those responding to violent movements within their own borders. It has haunted countries powerful and weak, rich and poor. The dilemma confronting a constitutional democracy having to respond to emergencies has been famously captured by Abraham Lincoln’s rhetorical question: “[A]re all the laws but one to go unexecuted, and the Government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?” Yet, prior to the attacks in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania, violent crises and emergencies and their implications for legal systems had not attracted much attention in legal scholarship…

“Plan Bukele” Goes Global: The Western Hemisphere is split over the extreme security policies of Salvadoran president Nayib Bukele. To his supporters, Bukele’s efforts at curbing violent crime in what was once one of the most notorious hotbeds of gang activity have been nothing short of herculean. To his detractors, the self-proclaimed “coolest dictator in the world” has exploited public security efforts to establish an ironclad grip on El Salvador’s political and civic space, with corrosive effects on the country’s democracy…

This article advocates the use of a “global conjunctural frame” to explore the martial law crisis provoked by the actions of South Korean President Yoon Seok-yeol in December 2024. It does so by tracking ongoing discussions among progressive intellectuals in South Korea and the contributors to this thematic section about the nature of Yoon’s attempted self-coup and the structures that enabled it with a focus on how the event and its aftermath resonates with notions of late or untimely forms of fascism. The article shows how far-right reactions involve a disturbing reworking of an enduring Cold War politics across global, national, and everyday scales to amplify resentments and antagonisms brought apart partly through structural changes associated with neoliberalism. It then reviews some of the ideas about the creation of a Seventh Republic that have emerged during Yoon’s impeachment and that advocate constitutional reforms to address this troubling conjuncture and recognize the new solidarities formed in defending democracy in South Korea…

The COVID-19 pandemic has led a large range of European governments to rely on emergency powers to try to contain the pandemic. While emergency legislation grants the executive with more extensive powers to handle an immediate threat to the survival of a community, the extent of such powers, their modalities of activation as well as the monitoring and other roles of counterpowers vary from one country to the next. This chapter analyses the diversity of practices and legal provisions hidden behind the reference to a “state of emergency.” It first shows that the legal basis of such provisions differs. While some governments activated constitutional provisions, others relied on pre-existing crisis-management legal frameworks. Second, the timing and duration of emergency measures ranged from 65 days (Estonia) to 861 (France). It then assesses whether differences in the legal framework used translated into differences in the stringency of the measures introduced. On the one hand, state of emergency provisions shield democracy against a concentration of powers in the hands of the executive better than disaster-management legislation does. On the other hand, the activation of emergency powers also coincides with more stringent restrictions of fundamental rights. In strengthening legal preparedness to future crises, policy makers need to be particularly cautious in devising legal arsenals that maintain high levels of democratic governance and oversight in crisis times…

Martial law has long been mired in confusion in the United States, but that has not always stopped state and federal officials from declaring it. Indeed, the Brennan Center has identified 68 declarations of martial law across U.S. history. Our research into these events is presented in the appendix below. It accompanies our report on martial law, which delves into the history of the concept and the legal principles that govern it.

We have organized the appendix by category based on the type of event that precipitated martial law. For each entry, we have included key information about the declaration such as the date, duration, location, related litigation, and who issued it. Unfortunately, the historical use of martial law in the United States is poorly documented and under-studied. For this reason, some of the entries in the appendix are incomplete. We have also chosen to exclude any event where there is any doubt as to whether martial law was declared…

Are citizens willing to trade long-term democratic stability for short-term security? We explore this question in Ecuador, where the powers of the executive and military have recently expanded in response to a dramatic rise in violent organized crime. Ahead of a national referendum proposing the expansion of these powers, we conducted a nationwide survey experiment. We find that informing citizens about the democratic risks of militarization — such as erosion of the rule of law or a heightened risk of an executive coup — significantly reduces support for a militarized approach to public security. This effect holds even when respondents are told that militarization may reduce violence. Our findings suggest that awareness of the potential democratic costs of widely used enforcement strategies, such as the militarization of security, could help prevent democratic backsliding in the face of heightened crime and violence…

Executive emergency powers are tantalizingly effective. They allow presidents to bypass congressional gridlock, do away with procedural safeguards, and act decisively with minimal oversight. But there is a risk that these exceptional powers may become a norm of domestic governance. This Note theorizes a problem of “partisan emergencies,” declared by a president despite significant disagreement about the factual existence of an emergency. One example is President Trump’s declaration of an emergency after Congress refused to fund his border wall. Other examples stem from Democrats calling on President Biden to declare an emergency to address issues like climate change and reproductive health. Congress, initially relying on a legislative veto to terminate such declarations, must now muster a supermajority if it disagrees with them. At the heart of the scheme is the National Emergencies Act, outlining how a president can declare a “national emergency” and what powers he unlocks by doing so without imposing a definition of the term. This Note surveys the judiciary’s recent treatment of emergency powers, positing that while courts are willing to engage in means-ends review about how an executive uses emergency powers, they are not willing to engage in the factual question of whether an emergency exists at all. This Note then argues that the judiciary must be willing to engage with this question to effectively rein in dubious invocations of emergency power…

This article analyzes the effectiveness of the right to seek asylum in the Hungarian legal system in the most recent emergency contexts. First, the legislative changes adopted following the so-called “migration crisis of 2015” are outlined, whereby the aim was to prevent access to the right to asylum. The measures introduced during the Covid-19 pandemic followed such a restrictive path. The article also assesses the conformity of the new measures with European and international law. To conclude, the armed conflict in Ukraine led to the coexistence of multiple emergency regimes, in which there is little room left to the effective exercise of the right to seek asylum…

This video lecture for Professor Dru Stevenson’s Administrative Law course (and Statutory Interpretation-Legislation) discusses the evolving Major Questions Doctrine and how it was applied and explained in Biden v. Nebraska, 143 S.Ct. 2355 (2023), in which the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the President's original student loan forgiveness program, which had relied on the HEROES Act of 2003, which allowed the Secretary of Education to “waive or modify” student loan provisions during a national emergency. The Court’s holding was that this emergency-related authority did not extend to cancelling hundreds of billions in student loan principal…

The fight against COVID-19 has led many countries, including liberal democracies, to take extraordinary measures that would undoubtedly be constitutionally problematic in normal times. Around the world, we have witnessed entire countries being locked-down, with mass surveillance of cellphones, suspended religious services, restricted travel, and military-enforced curfews. While these measures are widely supported by the publics in many countries, some scholars and activists have raised the alarm that these might lead to a deterioration of civil liberties and constitutional democracy long-term. Specifically, they worry that many leaders might not easily give up their newfound powers, and that civil liberty restrictions will become a new normal.

While it is of course too soon to explore the long-term consequences of COVID-19 for constitutional democracy, we believe that it is helpful to understand the legal bases for the extraordinary powers that governments are currently exercising. In this brief Essay, we find that, while the details of course vary from country to country, there are three broad legal bases for the COVID-19 measures: (1) the declaration of a state of emergency under the constitution, (2) the use of existing legislation dealing with public health or national disasters, and (3) the passing of new emergency legislation. In the remainder of this Essay, we describe these three broad approaches. In a follow-up Essay, we will evaluate their respective risks to civil liberties and the rule of law…

In States of Emergencies: Part I, the authors described how the legal bases for countries’ coronavirus responses typically fall into three broad categories. First, some countries have declared a state of emergency under their constitutions, which allow them to take special measures, including restrictions of civil liberties, for the duration of the emergency. Second, some countries have relied on existing legislation relating to communicable diseases, health, and/or national disasters and used these laws as the basis for their COVID-19 response. Third, some countries have (also) passed brand new legislation that grant the governments new powers to respond to COVID-19.

When governments are granted powers to restrict rights, there is always a risk of abuse. To minimize these risks, three broad principles are important: (1) providing for legislative and judicial oversight of the executive, (2) limiting exceptional measures to those strictly necessary, and (3) ensuring that such powers endure only for the duration of the outbreak…