In this provocative essay, Stephen Vladeck argues that a defining feature of the Roberts Court’s emergency docket jurisprudence has been an effort to preserve and reinforce the Supreme Court’s institutional supremacy, often at the expense of lower courts and Congress while enabling expansive exercises of executive authority. The article raises broader questions about whether exceptional authority can become concentrated within judicial institutions as well as executive ones, and how the normalization of extraordinary power across multiple branches of government may affect democratic accountability, institutional legitimacy, and the constitutional balance of power.

Shruti Gokhale conceptualizes nostalgia as a political technology rooted in the condemned and traumatic legacy of India's 1975 Emergency. She argues that the BJP's public condemnation of the Emergency paradoxically reproduces its governing logics, allowing the unresolved violence of the past to persist as an active force shaping contemporary governance.

The President’s power to remove and control subordinate executive officers has sparked a constitutional debate that began in 1789 and rages on today.  Leading originalists claim that the Constitution created a “unitary executive” President whose plenary removal power affords her “exclusive control” over subordinates’ exercise of executive power.  Text assigning the President a removal power and exclusive control appears nowhere in the Constitution, however, and unitary scholars have instead relied on select historical understandings and negative inferences drawn from a supposed lack of independent regulatory structures at the Founding.  The comprehensive historical record introduced by this article lays this debate to rest...

Using cross national cases, Johannes Thumfart discusses internet shutdowns (ISs) within the Just Securitization Theory (JST). Thumfart denies the legitimacy of the vast majority of ISs, while sketching four exception scenarios of ISs justification.  

Yung Lin argues that Taiwan's civic-embedded public diplomacy (CEPD) offers a distinct post-authoritarian model of conflict resolution in East Asia. The article shows how CEPD strengthens domestic legitimacy while managing identity-based conflict through the normalization of Taiwan's international visibility.

Should the Supreme Court craft a new rule of constitutional law cementing presidential control over the executive branch of government? Using the case studies of recent democratic decline in Hungary, Poland, and Turkey, David M. Driesen unpacks the implications of expanding executive authority.

Drawing on a comparative study of countries' responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, Tom Ginsburg and Mila Versteeg argue that courts, legislatures, and subnational governments remained important constraints on executive power during emergencies. The article develops a typology of crises to show that different emergencies require different modes of governance and concludes that many emergencies are better governed through Madisonian checks and balances than Schmittian executive dominance.

Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule examine the past, present, and future of the unitary executive theory, exploring competing constitutional interpretations of presidential control over the executive branch. The article analyzes the Supreme Court's treatment of the doctrine, particularly in Seila Law, and assesses its implications for presidential authority, independent agencies, and the separation of powers.

Prerogative, the power to take extra-legal measures in extraordinary circumstances, is generally considered to be the exclusive domain of the executive. This article shows that James Madison, who is widely regarded as hostile to discretionary power in the executive, not only endorsed exercises of prerogative by the executive but also took steps toward developing a model of prerogative that gives primacy to the legislature in times of emergency. Madison’s views on “legislative prerogative” emerged in the context of congressional debates over avowedly unconstitutional proposals including a grant of military authority to seize private property during the revolutionary war, the creation of the Bank of North America under the Articles of Confederation, and the provision of financial assistance to refugees from St. Domingo. These cases reveal a strict constructionist resorting to extra-legal measures to pursue objectives not expressly authorized by the constitution then in place as a safer alternative to more permanent expansions of government power established through law.

This Foreword introduces the special issue of the European Journal of Risk Regulation entitled “Constitutional Risk Management in the V4 Countries,” which examines how constitutional democracies respond to crises through emergency legal regimes and exceptional powers. Focusing on the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, the issue explores the constitutional management of crises including the COVID-19 pandemic, war, migration, and environmental emergencies. The collection analyzes both the legal frameworks governing states of exception and the broader normative question of how democratic systems can preserve rule-of-law safeguards during prolonged crises. ISSE will publish each article from the special issue as standalone website entries in the coming weeks. All materials are Open Access and distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution license.

One of the goals of this paper is to define the most important concepts for the comparative study of the constitutional risk management of the V4 countries. For this purpose, first, it considers the theoretical difficulties of conceptualising emergencies, especially focussing on what kind of response can be given to the widespread view that considers emergencies as a kind of legal “black hole” due to their unpredictability. Then a general definition of “emergency” is discussed which is broad and flexible enough to serve as a basis not only for a comparative study but also for the constitutional discourse of emergencies. Constitutional crisis management as a core concept for such an undertaking is also canvassed. After defining the basic concepts essential for evaluation and comparison, the article outlines the general types of emergency regulatory regimes. The development of effective regulatory systems for emergencies also has to face certain problems that every constitutional polity must solve. Finally, the paper summarises assessment criteria necessary for the evaluation and a comparison of the emergency constitutions of different countries.

European constitutions differ greatly in the depth to which they deal with emergencies: while many constitutions devote more or less detailed regulation to emergency regimes, others almost completely neglect these issues or dedicate only some very short and vague references to emergency situations and powers. This article aims to carry out a systematic comparison of the emergency-related provisions of forty European constitutions, focusing on (1) the level of detail of the regulation, (2) the emergency regimes addressed, and (3) the restrictions on fundamental rights. As the study points out, only two out of the forty constitutions are completely silent on emergency powers. However, the remaining thirty-eight constitutions show wide variation in the level of detail of the emergency regulation; the vast majority of the emergency regimes are related to war or armed attack (or the danger thereof), to internal crises threatening the constitutional order, and to natural disasters. Concerning fundamental rights, the examination of the constitutional texts confirms that twenty-five out of the forty constitutions encompass some provisions on the restriction of these rights in a state of emergency.

The paper outlines Czech constitutional law and the development of emergency law. Initially, the legislature did not expect emergencies to occur, perhaps due to the idealistic optimism associated with the general atmosphere of the collapse of the Eastern Bloc in 1989 and the “End of History” thesis. As a result, emergencies were not regulated by Czech law in the 1990s. This changed after the great floods at the end of the 1990s, when “history returned,” and the need for some special rules for emergencies became clear. The first decades of this century showed that Czech emergency law worked well for short-term natural disasters. The game-changer came in 2020, with the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic and the need for a long-term state of emergency. It soon became clear that the rules that worked for floods and other disasters did not work for long-term global pandemics. In other words, the legal system was not prepared for a situation in which emergencies were the rule rather than the exception. Legislators were unable to prepare a long-term legislative response to fill this gap. The memory of COVID-19 is fading fast, and there are no plans to reform the relevant legislation. Accordingly, any new pandemic or similar event will lead to the same problems that the Czech legal system had to deal with from 2020 to 2022.

The paper offers a comprehensive overview of Hungary’s emergency law and its misuse over the four years since its introduction in March 2020. Hungary serves as a clear example of how a “state of danger” – initially intended as an exceptional legal measure – can become normalised through repeated declarations. The populist government’s continuous use of emergency powers has led to unchecked lawmaking and the manipulation of legal frameworks to advance populist agendas. The article argues that while Hungary’s detailed emergency provisions in the Fundamental Law were intended to serve as a form of constitutional risk management, after four years of living in a permanent “state of danger”, the scholarly debate has shifted to whether this very risk management has itself become the risk. According to emergency law theory, managing constitutional risks is equally vital in the emergency legal order. Yet in Hungary, both the black letter of the law and the constitutional practices observed during and after the COVID-19 pandemic – along with the Ninth Amendment to the Fundamental Law, which introduced a new emergency regime in 2021 – reveal that constitutional risk management has ultimately failed. This is manifest in the erosion of the separation of powers, the weakening of judicial review, and the shrinking of human rights protections. The article substantiates its argument by examining the related constitutional framework and constitutional practice in Hungary between 2020 and 2024.

This article analyses the constitutional framework regulating states of emergency in Poland and addresses key issues related to their interpretation and implementation. The first part discusses the conditions for declaring martial law, a state of an extraordinary situation, and a state of natural disaster, as well as the specific rules for the operation of public authorities in such emergencies. The next part analyses the practice, revealing the consistent reluctance of Polish authorities to invoke states of emergency, even in circumstances that seem to justify such measures. Consequently, a state of emergency under the 1997 Constitution was declared in Poland only once – in 2021, in response to a migration crisis on the border with Belarus. No constitutional emergency was declared during the COVID-19 pandemic, despite the introduction of far-reaching restrictions on individual rights and freedoms. The article argues that state authorities can abuse emergency regulations, either through their unjustified application or by deliberately circumventing them.

This article contributes to understanding how inexperience and lack of commitment to evidence-based decision making may undermine an otherwise broadly functional framework for constitutional risk management. As part of a focus on the “Visegrád Four” countries, it also helps understand regional dynamics since the COVID-19 pandemic as the most visible emergency after 1989. The article starts with a brief elucidation of the political contexts that have shaped Slovakia’s constitutional risk management, focusing on the developments from 2020 through early 2025. An analysis of mechanisms of emergency risk management in the constitutional framework follows, that helps identify key state authorities attempting to make decisions under serious time pressures. The implementation of the constitutional framework during the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrates the creation of new avenues for restricting rights and bolstering executive competence, with the formally powerful constitutional review mechanisms struggling to challenge these decisions. Ultimately, political context emerges as key: Slovakia entered the COVID-19 pandemic with a governing coalition enjoying constitutional majority and an aura of reform and hope. The emergency mismanagement not only facilitated the breakup of this coalition and early elections, but also a rise in emergency conspiracies openly hostile to institutions and actors committed to evidence-based decision making.

Our special issue examines the regulation and practice of constitutional risk management in the V(isegrád)-4 countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia). Unfortunately, the treatment of the COVID-19 pandemic made this enterprise relevant, as all four countries had to face a similar health emergency. This article presents the most important experiences and trends in the constitutional crisis management of the four countries, identifying the challenges that the constitutional emergency regulatory regimes have encountered so far. Our paper argues that despite the basically similar constitutional frameworks, these countries typically handled the crisis in a different way, and in the process many constitutional problems arose for which there was no clear or uniform solution. Since the purpose of the international comparative research that is the basis of our special issue was to examine the emergency constitution of these four countries in general (since it will have to be applied to possible later, other types of emergencies), in the last chapter of the article we examine the possibilities of a proposition that represents a novelty in the constitutional discourse on emergency situations: this is an option for the convergence of emergency constitutions.

What are the conditions for effective crisis management in multi-level systems characterized by overlapping territorial and ethnic structures? To answer this question, this article considers evidence from Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). BiH’s fragmented governance often hinders effective vertical and horizontal coordination across government levels. Drawing on two case studies—the 2014 floods (an internal crisis) and the COVID-19 pandemic (an external crisis)—the analysis reveals how substate entities’ extensive exclusive powers promote unilateral decision-making and limit the ability to address crises collectively. The evidence shows that internal crises often exacerbate fragmentation, while external crises may initially foster coordination before political and structural limitations reassert dominance. Further, while community activism assists in addressing coordination gaps, it cannot substitute for gaps in governance.

The article aims to analyze the meaning and place of states of emergency as a special legal regime in the legislation of the Visegrad Group countries. The main research question is about the role of states of emergency in the political system of the Visegrad Group countries, the practice of their application in the face of special threats, and the consequences of states of emergency for citizens and state authorities. Are states of emergency an effective tool for dealing with special threats or an instrument that the government uses to strengthen its power? The main thesis is that political practice has revealed the lack of a coherent model of the Visegrad Group countries’ strategy for overcoming the emergency and using the instrument of struggle in the form of states of emergency. In the case of Hungary, it can be seen that the state of emergency has become an instrument used by the government to strengthen its power. The methods used are the comparative method to compare the practice of application and the regulations in force in the Visegrad Group countries regarding the category of states of emergency.

In 2025, President Donald Trump expanded his own powers through unprecedented interpretations of congressional statutes and Article II of the US Constitution. Ensuing waves of litigation and a record number of emergency-relief applications by the administration to the US Supreme Court placed extraordinary pressure on the federal judiciary. Although US district judges have delayed or halted a range of significant administrative actions, this article’s overview of Trump 47 in court highlights three different scholarly approaches that doubt that the US Supreme Court alone can or ultimately will reverse the administration’s agenda. First, the Roberts Court’s emergency docket decisions thus far comport with recent polarization trends in presidential-power cases. Second, the US Supreme Court lacks institutional capacity and consistent jurisprudence to challenge each area of alleged presidential overreach. Third, the administration’s use of broad authorities previously delegated by Congress serves as a reminder that constitutional interpretation and executive-branch powers are rooted in the broader political system. Congress cannot easily retract granted authority but curtailing presidential unilateralism requires more than litigation.