Short-term Security or Long-term Democratic Stability? Evidence from Ecuador’s war on gangs
Journal Article: Short-term Security or Long-term Democratic Stability? Evidence from Ecuador’s war on gangs
Journal: None, versions of this paper appear to have been delivered at several conferences and this is the most current version
Date of Publication: 25 June 2025
Author: Juan Masullo, University of Milan and Leiden University, juan.masullo@unimi.it; David Morisi, University of Southern Denmark, morisi@sam.sdu.dk
How to Cite: Masullo, Juan; Morisi, Davide. (2025) Short-term Security or Long-term Democratic Stability? Evidence from Ecuador’s war on gangs. 10.31219/osf.io/uafnr_v1
Abstract: Are citizens willing to trade long-term democratic stability for short-term security? We explore this question in Ecuador, where the powers of the executive and military have recently expanded in response to a dramatic rise in violent organized crime. Ahead of a national referendum proposing the expansion of these powers, we conducted a nationwide survey experiment. We find that informing citizens about the democratic risks of militarization — such as erosion of the rule of law or a heightened risk of an executive coup — significantly reduces support for a militarized approach to public security. This effect holds even when respondents are told that militarization may reduce violence. Our findings suggest that awareness of the potential democratic costs of widely used enforcement strategies, such as the militarization of security, could help prevent democratic backsliding in the face of heightened crime and violence.
The full text of the article and a .pdf version is available here.
