Emergency powers during COVID-19: when democracies stepped outside normal bounds

When COVID-19 swept the world, governments invoked sweeping emergency powers and tolls meant for war or catastrophe to restrict movement, control information, and consolidate authority. The pandemic tested the balance between public health and civil liberties, revealing how quickly exceptional emergency powers could become normalized.

The Hungarian parliament in March 202 passed a law granting the government the ability to rule by decree indefinitely and expanding the penal code to criminalize “false information” about the pandemic. The measure effectively suspended legislative oversight and marked on of the European Union’s sharpest democratic backslides, according to watchdog groups.

In the Philippines, President Rodrigo Duterte’s Bayanihan to Heal as One Act empowered his administration to reallocate funds, enforce lockdowns, and punish what it deemed misinformation. Thousands were arrested for curfew and quarantine violations as police and soldiers patrolled the streets. Rights advocates said the emergency blurred the line between public health and coercion.

France declared a nationwide health emergency that allowed the executive to impose curfews and restrict movement by decree, while El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele defied court rulings to detain citizens in '“containment centers.” In Sri Lanka and Egypt, leaders invoked long-standing emergency or defense laws to deploy troops domestically and silence criticism.

The Indian government imposed one of the world’s strictest lockdowns under the Disaster Management Act of 2005, halting transport and confining 1.3 billion people with only a few hours’ notice. The abrupt shutdown stranded millions of migrant workers and triggered a humanitarian crisis. Analysts observed that powers shifted sharply toward the central government, leaving regional authorities with limited authority.

Turkey also relied on emergency provisions to manage its pandemic response. Authorities prosecuted journalists and social-media users for “spreading fear or panic,” banned protests, and used public-health regulations to curb dissent. Critics said the government’s approach reinforced pre-existing trends towards executive dominance and limited transparency.

Malaysian Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin declared a nationwide state of emergency in January 2021, suspending parliament and postponing elections. Citing the pandemic, his administration issued a “fake new” ordinance criminalizing COVID-related misinformation with penalties of up to three years in prison. Rights groups warned the measure curtailed free expression while bolstering a fragile government’s hold on power.

These examples illustrated what political theorists describe as a state of exception - when governments extend authority beyond normal legal limits in the name of survival. Many decrees lacked firm end dates or review mechanisms, and in several cases legislatures were sidelined for months.

Not all democracies took that path. Germany, New Zealand, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea operated largely within existing health laws rather than open-ended emergency regimes. Their legislatures stayed active, courts reviewed restrictions, and most measures were time limited. South Korea’s digital tracing system tested privacy boundaries but remained within statutory frameworks and was scaled back once infections fell.

The pandemic forced governments to navigate the tension between urgency and accountability. Rapid action saved lives, but emergency governance could further erode trust in institutions where transparency was weak. And once leaders exercised exceptional powers, rolling them back proved politically difficult.

COVID-19 showed that in moments of fear and uncertainty, even democracies can edge toward misuses of states of exception. Ensuring such measures remain temporary may be the hardest recovery of all.

Photo by jameson wu on Unsplash.