Post-War Security Sector Reform in Taiwan
Post-War Security Sector Reform in Taiwan
Source: DCAF - Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance. DCAF creates innovative knowledge products, promotes norms and good practices, and provides legal and policy advice dedicated to making states and people safer through more effective and accountable security and justice. DCAF supports capacity building of state, civil society and private sector stakeholders by providing access to independent expertise and information on Security Sector Governance and Reform. More on DCAF can be found here.
Date of Publication: 2026
Author: Wei-chin Lee. Dr. Wei-chin is a professor in the Department of Politics and International Affairs at Wake Forest University.
A link to the article can be found here, and a PDF of the article can be found here.
Abstract: Taiwan’s civil–military relations have been through several transitions since the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) retreated to the island in 1949. With the establishment of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 1986, Taiwan’s democratic transition and consolidation started rounds of regime turnovers (KMT, 1949–2000 and 2008–2016; DPP, 2000–2008 and 2016–2024). Each change in civilian regime became a testing ground for Taiwan’s civil–military relations, which is an important testimony to Taiwan’s democratic resilience and vitality in facing security threats from China. This research briefly describes the trajectory of Taiwan’s civil–military relations. It then draws several crucial variables affecting civil– military relations, including the geopolitical changes in the international environment and cross-strait relations, the democratic prerogatives of transparency and accountability in defense spending, the shift in Taiwan’s defense strategy, defensive effectiveness, military service personnel, the public’s view of Taiwan’s military capability, US military assistance, and identity controversy between indigenous identity awareness and the former China-centered identity. It concludes with some lessons that Taiwan’s civil–military relations can impart to Ukraine
Why We Are Recommending This Article:
Taiwan was governed under martial law from 1949 to 1987, a period of nearly thirty-eight years that remains one of the longest continuous states of emergency in modern history. Following the retreat of the Kuomintang to Taiwan after the Chinese Civil War, the government justified extraordinary powers as necessary to confront the continuing military threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party and the unresolved conflict across the Taiwan Strait. During this period, emergency authorities expanded executive power, restricted political opposition, limited civil liberties, and reshaped the country’s constitutional and security institutions.
The lifting of martial law in 1987 marked the beginning of a long democratic transition rather than the end of Taiwan’s constitutional transformation. Over the following decades, Taiwan undertook extensive reforms to strengthen civilian control of the military, expand legislative oversight, reform security institutions, and rebuild democratic accountability while continuing to confront an enduring external security threat.
This study examines Taiwan’s post-authoritarian security sector reforms and the institutional changes that accompanied its transition from decades of emergency rule to constitutional democracy. It explores how civilian oversight, democratic accountability, and professional security institutions were gradually strengthened while preserving the state’s ability to respond to persistent external security challenges.
For ISSE, Taiwan represents one of the most significant contemporary examples of how constitutional systems recover from prolonged periods of exceptional governance. Much of the literature on emergency powers focuses on the expansion and normalization of extraordinary authority. Taiwan’s experience illustrates the equally demanding work of restoring constitutional governance after emergency institutions have become deeply embedded within the state. The article therefore offers valuable insight into the long-term institutional, legal, and political processes required to rebuild democratic oversight while maintaining national security under continuing external pressure.
