A Threat to the Constitutional Order - American Enterprise Institute
The views expressed in this American Enterprise Institute op-ed below are solely those of its author. They do not reflect the views, positions, or policy recommendations of the Institute for the Study of States of Exception (ISSE), which does not take institutional positions on editorial commentary. The material is presented to illustrate a perspective relevant to ongoing debates concerning emergency powers and governance.
Title: A Threat to the Constitutional Order
Source: American Enterprise Institute (AEI)
Date of Publication: April 16, 2026
Author: Peter J. Wallison. Wallison is a senior fellow emeritus at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where he studies constitutional law and the growth of the administrative state (that is, the increasing power of unelected officials of executive branch agencies). More on Wallison can be found here.
A link to the article can be found here.
This op-ed examines the Supreme Court’s pending consideration of Trump v. Slaughter, a case that could significantly expand presidential authority over independent federal agencies and further institutionalize expansive interpretations of Unitary Executive Theory. The piece argues that permitting presidents to remove officials from independent regulatory agencies absent malfeasance would fundamentally alter the constitutional balance between Congress and the executive branch, placing large portions of the administrative state under direct presidential policy control. Particularly relevant to ISSE’s work is the article’s warning that the gradual concentration of executive authority can occur not only through formal emergency declarations, but also through judicial reinterpretations of constitutional structure that normalize increasingly centralized forms of governance over time. The essay also highlights broader debates surrounding separation of powers, democratic accountability, administrative independence, and the erosion of institutional guardrails originally designed to prevent excessive concentrations of executive power. More broadly, the article raises important questions about how constitutional democracies preserve constraints on executive authority when doctrines justified in the name of efficiency, accountability, or national leadership begin to reshape the ordinary functioning of state institutions themselves.
