Abstract: Recent UK legislative reform has further empowered the UK Executive, degrading horizontal and vertical constraints on powers interfering with human rights, and this has largely taken place via the ‘back door’ through repeated marginalisation of Parliament. Between 2021 and 2023, 11 pieces of primary legislation were given Royal Assent which narrowed Executive accountability mechanisms in relation to coercive and administrative powers identified as weakening human rights protections by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Echoing both recent and long-standing trends in UK law-making, such reform has been sent through Parliament while employing mechanisms of parliamentary marginalisation, undermining the ability of parliamentarians and broader civil society to scrutinise the changes. The passing of a constitutionally significant group of legislation in this manner created a ‘back door’ through which the UK Executive was able to expand its powers with minimal scrutiny. Such backdoor Executive empowerment supports scholarship highlighting the lack of firm UK constitutional constraints of the Executive. While the paper’s analysis does not make a claim on the overall status of UK democracy, it does argue that the recent legal reform mirrors dynamics identified with respect to democratic erosion, suggesting the need for further assessment of the UK’s democratic health.

ISSE Comment: Unlike the constitutional structure of the United States, which is defined by three formally separate and co-equal branches, the United Kingdom operates under a parliamentary system within a constitutional monarchy, where the Government is drawn from and dependent upon a majority in Parliament. In principle, this fusion of executive and legislative authority is designed to ensure political accountability and coherence, avoiding the institutional deadlock that can arise in presidential systems when different branches are controlled by opposing parties. The loss of parliamentary confidence can rapidly dissolve a government and trigger new elections, reinforcing this model of political responsibility. At the same time, this structure affords the Government significant control over the legislative agenda, often to a degree not seen in more rigidly separated systems.

Against this institutional backdrop, Lock’s analysis in Backdoor Executive Empowerment identifies a concerning evolution in legislative practice. She argues that, notwithstanding the Government’s already substantial procedural advantages, recent reforms have increasingly relied on mechanisms that marginalize parliamentary scrutiny, such as compressed legislative timetables and constrained debate, to facilitate the passage of controversial measures, particularly those expanding executive authority and weakening accountability safeguards. While these practices do not invoke formal emergency powers or states of exception, they reflect a functionally analogous dynamic: the incremental reconfiguration of constitutional constraints through procedural means that operate below the threshold of overt crisis. In this sense, the trend raises broader questions central to ISSE’s work, namely, how exceptional forms of governance can emerge not only through declared emergencies, but through the gradual normalization of practices that diminish oversight, transparency, and democratic deliberation.

This paper argues that liberal authoritarianism – defined here as a liberal technique of government fusing authoritarianism with liberalism for the purpose of the ‘free market’, following Hermann Heller – corresponds a form of dual constitutionalism or fragmented legality. Dual constitutionalism, originally a colonial technique of governance, relies on a liberal constitution enshrining a state of exception which suspends it on specific matters, territories, and during certain times. It can be either military – called in France the ‘state of siege’, the continental version of the British Martial Law – or civilian – the ‘state of emergency’. In the case of France, liberal authoritarianism has witnessed several declinations since the French Revolution, flourishing in the liberal colonialism of the late 19th century, then the full-fledged liberal authoritarianism of the interwar period, and eventually in the neoliberal authoritarianism of the 4th and 5th republic. Focusing on the relationship between France and its Algerian colony during the Third Republic (1870–1940), one of the most liberal periods ever in French history, it documents how the State of Exception was used to establish a legalised state of dictatorship where all executive, legislative and judicial powers were vested in the hands of a governor, in order to force the creation of markets by breaking down collective land ownership and use and other non-liberal economic customs of the local population, using, in particular, the legal tool of the ‘sequestre’ which allowed the State to forcibly expropriate land and seize assets of the local population without compensation, forced labour and internment camps – all in order to incentivize ‘free enterprise’ by the colonizers. Many of these legal tools and techniques migrated back to the metropolis when the Third Republic officially dissolved into a Nazi State in 1940, through legal means and in accordance with the constitutional procedures of the Third Republic.

On February 20, 2026, the Supreme Court issued its decision in the consolidated tariffs cases, Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump and Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc., holding 6–3 that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorize the President to impose tariffs. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that although IEEPA grants broad authority to regulate economic transactions during declared national emergencies, it does not include the distinct power to levy tariffs or duties — authorities constitutionally assigned to Congress under Article I. The Court further held that the Major Questions Doctrine applies even in the context of emergency statutes addressing foreign affairs, and that Congress must speak clearly if it intends to delegate tariff-setting authority of such vast economic and political significance. Because IEEPA contains no explicit reference to tariffs or duties, the challenged “Liberation Day” and reciprocal tariffs were deemed unlawful.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump blocks the use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to impose tariffs, drawing an important statutory boundary around executive emergency authority. But the ruling turns on textual limits, not on scrutiny of the underlying emergency itself. As a result, while the Court prevented one expansion of presidential power, it left intact the broader architecture through which emergency declarations can accumulate authority over time. The case illustrates a central tension in contemporary governance: judicial intervention may constrain specific statutory overreach, even as the structural normalization of emergency power continues.

In January 2026, Guatemala invoked a 30-day state of siege after prison riots and coordinated attacks linked to the transnational gang Barrio 18 left 11 police officers dead. Ratified by Congress, the measure temporarily expanded police and military authority and was followed by a nationwide state of prevention once the siege expired. Government officials reported substantial security gains, including arrests, major drug seizures, and reductions in extortion and homicide. This analysis considers the episode through the framework of the state of exception, examining how constitutional democracies authorize extraordinary powers in moments of crisis and how those powers, even when formally time-bound, illuminate the delicate line between safeguarding public order and redefining the contours of ordinary law.

On February 20, the Supreme Court ruled that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, known as IEEPA, does not authorize President Trump’s sweeping tariffs. In Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, and the consolidated case, the Court held that the statute does not grant the President the power to impose tariffs under a declaration of economic emergency. In this podcast episode from the National Constitution Center, we explore what the Court held, why the Justices disagreed about the reasoning, and what this decision might tell us about the future of presidential emergency power. To help us explore these questions are two leading Court watchers and constitutional experts, Zachary Shemtob of SCOTUSblog and Ilya Somin of the George Mason University. Julie Silverbrook, vice president of civic education of the National Constitution Center, moderates.

The political rhetoric surrounding the Horn of Africa is perpetually framed through narratives of crisis, tragedy and emergency. These labels, rather than simply being used to describe instability, function as tools of governance to normalise dysfunction and entrench cycles of dependency. Drawing on postcolonial frameworks, the discourse interrogates how such crisis narratives obscure and ignore structural issues. Further, this sustains and promotes external authority, often rooted in colonial narratives of the region. The exploration of case studies, Somalia and South Sudan, highlighting how international interventions, often framed as peacebuilding or humanitarian efforts, reinforce the very ‘crisis’ it aims to address. The solution to decolonise this paradigm created by western interventionist economies lies in alternatives grounded in African epistemologies of governance that centre local sovereignty. In doing so, reimagining governance beyond ‘emergency’, towards sustainable political autonomy, rooted in localised political power, emerges as the primary, if not only, viable solution.

The Supreme Court’s consideration of Trump v. Slaughter raises more than a dispute over agency removal protections. In the accompanying Lawfare article, Michael R. Dreeben examines whether overruling Humphrey’s Executor might be counterbalanced by renewed limits on congressional delegation. ISSE’s analysis builds on that doctrinal discussion to explore a related structural question: how weakening agency independence could reshape the architecture of emergency governance. Together, the pieces illuminate how shifts in administrative design may alter not only separation-of-powers doctrine, but also the institutional channels through which exceptional authority is exercised.

On January 29, 2026, U.S. President Donald J. Trump signed an Executive Order titled “Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Cuba,” declaring that the current geopolitical dynamics involving Cuba constitute an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to U.S. national security and foreign policy, and as such further constitute a formal national emergency under the National Emergencies Act (NEA) and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).

This explainer situates the declaration within the broader framework of U.S. emergency powers, outlining the legal authorities invoked and the mechanisms through which the order is intended to be implemented. ISSE’s analysis focuses on clarifying how this emergency functions in practice, what it enables as a matter of law, and why its invocation matters in the context of the growing normalization of emergency authorities in U.S. governance. The piece is intended to provide readers with a clear, accessible account of the declaration itself and its immediate implications, rather than a normative assessment of U.S.-Cuba policy.

Summary: “Sovereign is he,” wrote the German political theorist Carl Schmitt in 1922, “who decides on the exception.” The opening line of Political Theology was meant to shock even a century ago. In a liberal democracy, after all, sovereignty rests in “the people,” not in a “he” who “decides” on an “exception.” But Schmitt is the great prophet of liberal breakdown. He understood liberalism as an Enlightenment project that would not survive the modern era of mass industry, mass media, and mass politics. The liberal state runs smoothly on its rails of law and norms until it encounters the “exception”—a strike, a beer-hall putsch. Then, and only then, when someone (some “he”) steps forward to fill the vacuum with action (the decision) do we discover where true power—that is, sovereignty—lies. At the moment of crisis, the flimsy structure of liberal normativity collapses and power reveals itself. Schmitt was the twentieth century’s own Thomas Hobbes. Perhaps we would regard him today as the preeminent rival of Jürgen Habermas or John Rawls—the great liberal thinkers of the twentieth century—had he not, at the decisive moment of his career, welcomed, celebrated, and justified the Leviathan of his own day: Adolf Hitler.

It is a safe bet that Donald Trump had not read Political Theology when he declared his own version of a state of exception on January 20. Trump did not need an actual crisis in order to issue a torrent of executive orders usurping the independence of federal agencies, preempting the role of Congress, threatening the press, mobilizing the armed forces against immigrants, etc. As Trump himself put it, “He who saves his country does not violate any law.” He had filled the vacuum with decisive acts. Whether Trump will turn out to be “America’s Hitler,” as Vice President J.D. Vance once suggested before changing his mind, he is a kind of fulfillment of Schmitt’s dire expectations.

Until very recently we would have said that history had proved Schmitt wrong. In the decades after the Second World War, Germany, Japan, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and other autocratic powers made a peaceful transition to liberal democracy. Europe became, as the pundit and historian Robert Kagan put it, “a Kantian paradise.” Now we have to wonder if Schmitt’s dark prophecies were merely premature, and it was not the industrial but the post-industrial era that put the quietus to liberalism.

This is Carl Schmitt’s moment. In the past year, two New York Times columnists have accused Trump and his followers of borrowing from Schmitt’s playbook. J.D. Vance has insisted that, on the contrary, it is liberals who share Schmitt’s fixation with raw power. 

ISSE Comment: This article is included on the ISSE website because it examines the treatment of fundamental rights within the broader context of armed conflict and emergency governance. Although it does not focus on the formal exercise of emergency powers, it provides a detailed analysis of how freedom of political expression is regulated, limited, and justified during periods of heightened security concern, and in this instance, under martial law. The study contributes to ISSE’s research agenda by illuminating how international legal standards, domestic legal frameworks, and institutional practices interact under crisis conditions, offering valuable insight into the protection of democratic rights during and beyond emergencies.

Abstract: The article is devoted to a comprehensive study of the right to freedom of expression of political views during armed conflict. It examines the nature of this right as one of the fundamental elements of a democratic society, defines its content, functions, international legal guarantees, and national mechanisms for its realization and limitation. Given the ongoing armed aggression against Ukraine, the issue of the permissible limits of state interference in freedom of expression under the pretext of national security protection has become particularly relevant. The article analyzes the norms of international law, including the provisions of Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), recommendations of the Council of Europe, and the positions of the OSCE, the United Nations, and leading international organizations such as ARTICLE 19 and CPJ. Special attention is given to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, which establishes key approaches to the protection of political expression even under crisis conditions. The study presents a number of real-life examples from the Ukrainian context, such as the blocking of media outlets by decisions of the National Security and Defense Council, illegal surveillance of journalists, administrative pressure on editorial offices, and increased self-censorship under martial law. These phenomena are analyzed in terms of their compliance with the Constitution of Ukraine and international legal standards. It is determined that the existing legal protection mechanisms are insufficient or ineffective, which threatens the democratic balance of power during wartime. The author proposes a set of specific measures to maintain the balance between security needs and freedom of expression, including the harmonization of national legislation with international standards, the creation of independent institutions to monitor restrictions on freedom of speech, the enhancement of legal and physical protection for journalists, the development of digital and media literacy among the population, as well as cooperation with technology platforms to ensure transparent content blocking procedures. It is concluded that the right to freedom of expression of political views plays no less important a role during wartime than in peacetime: it serves as a safeguard against authoritarianism, an indicator of governmental legitimacy, and a foundation for the post-war democratic reconstruction of the state. Ignoring this dimension not only violates Ukraine’s international obligations but also poses a threat to internal political stability in the context of national recovery.

When living in a time of crisis, it becomes easy to forget that our institutions have been through crisis before. That our institutions are still here and operating today is a testament to the fact that they are, on some meaningful level, resilient to incredible strain. This is, in large part, because they were designed to operate under this strain. While the Framers of the Constitution were undoubtedly working to build a government that operated effectively on a day-to-day basis, they were also preoccupied with creating a structure that could withstand extreme pressure, respond to threats, correct its own errors, and survive to work for the general welfare of the American people in the long run. One element of the constitutional design central to this resiliency is the availability of vast emergency powers to use in response to exceptional threats. Of course, no system is perfect, and no matter the intentions of the Framers, as American civilization has developed and expanded, so too has the complexity of our society and governmental structure. If the SARS-Cov-2 pandemic has shown anything, it is that there is great disagreement as to what the theoretical and actual limits of federal emergency powers are and ought to be.

“Emergency” is, of course, a very difficult legal concept to define and analyze, not least because it implicates an endless range of topics, from the very broad to the very specific. Emergency, and especially extreme and existential emergency, interacts with fundamental  principles as the basis of sovereignty itself and the very nature of government and the state—if a government cannot adequately protect its people from a crisis, that government is not likely to survive. Still, as with any legal principle, the principle must be made to function in the real world, whether it be through constitutions, both written and implied, or through more mundane and routine statutory law. Complicating any analysis of emergency and emergency powers even further, there is not only no agreement on what precisely an emergency is or ought to be, but there is also no theoretical end to the nature and type of possible emergencies that could arise, especially as society continues to develop and grow ever more complex.

It is essential to begin any analysis of federal emergency power in the United States by understanding the theoretical, constitutional, and statutory bases for such powers, the history of the use of such powers, and where the law stands today. In an attempt to aid in this understanding, this Note will explore the theoretical and constitutional basis for federal emergency power, arguing first that the conception of federal emergency powers in the United States Constitution is best understood as expansive and flexible, and second, that the primary, though not exclusive, functional limits to this power are the protections found within the structural portion of the Constitution, namely separation of powers and the political process. This Note will then turn to how the statutory law of emergency functions and has developed under the constitutional structure, arguing that, while the constitutional framework for handling emergencies lays out a strong and flexible structure for addressing emergency, the statutory law of emergency which has subsequently grown underneath the constitutional structure contain many concerning faults in implementation.

While public attention has recently focused on events in Venezuela and the ICE killing of Renee Good in Minneapolis, two court decisions issued shortly before Christmas (one by a federal district court and one by the Supreme Court) warrant closer scrutiny. In each case, the judiciary imposed at least temporary limits on the current administration’s assertion of extraordinary executive authority. Although neither arose from a formally declared state of emergency, both reflect an expansive conception of presidential power in which certain actions are treated as categorically insulated from judicial review.

In this respect, the cases illustrate how exceptional power may be exercised without explicit invocation of emergency authorities, not by suspending the law temporarily, but by asserting that entire domains of executive action lie beyond ordinary legal constraint. This mode of governance closely aligns with the most maximalist contours of unitary executive theory and functions as a de facto state of exception embedded within constitutional interpretation itself.

This article seeks to capture the transformative potential of emergency powers, as a legal–political practice pertaining to liberal legality that ultimately can determine constitutional change, rather than a return to ‘normality’. It does so by providing an analysis of the transition from formal and limited liberal legality in Romania to the series of dictatorships that followed the instauration of the regime of royal dictatorship of King Carol II in 1938. Anchored in a close reading of the archival documents of the trial of the leader of the main far right movement, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, and the subsequent legal proceedings, the proposed article aims to produce revaluation of the jurisprudential and constitutional status of the regime of King Carol II with a view of understanding the emergency-based dimension of this rule and the particular shift it operated foundational legal categories in criminal and constitutional law. I proceed by examining the current theoretical limitations in addressing the historical role of emergency in relation to constitutional orders. I turn then to exploring the political and legal context of the prorogation of emergency measures in 1938 Romania. Last, I examine the limited status of modern legality in a situation oversaturated by emergency measures.

Nine of 10 modern constitutions contain explicit emergency provisions describing who can declare a state of emergency (and under what conditions) and the additional powers the government enjoys under a state of emergency. As states of emergency typically allocate additional powers to the executive, they lend themselves easily to abuse and provide political incentives to declare emergencies. In this paper, we analyze the conditions under which government behavior under a state of emergency deviates from constitutional provisions and a gap between de jure provisions and de facto behavior thus results. In a novel data set comprising 853 emergency declarations, 115 are identified as unlawful. We find that autocratic governments are more likely than democratic governments to violate the constitution. The requirement that a second chamber approve the emergency declaration is associated with a higher likelihood of its being unconstitutional.

This article examines whether large-scale cyberattacks can be a legitimate reason for declaring a state of emergency. The central thesis is that while cyberattacks do not fit into the traditional categories of emergencies, their increasing capacity to seriously disrupt essential state functions calls for a reassessment of the legal thresholds for the use of emergency powers. The article argues that a cyberattack can justify the declaration of a state of emergency if it causes a systemic disruption to critical infrastructure, public order or national security and reaches a level of severity comparable to conventional emergencies. Real-world examples such as the cyberattacks on Estonia in 2007 and the ransomware crisis in Costa Rica in 2022 show different state responses and the evolving legal perception of cyber threats. At the same time, the article warns against the normalization of emergency regimes in response to persistent or unclear threats in cyberspace. The risk is that democratic governance is undermined by the prolonged or unjustified use of exceptional measures. While cyberattacks can in certain and extreme circumstances justify a state of emergency, such decisions must remain the exception and subject to the principles of necessity, proportionality and democratic control.

This workshop brought together scholars of law, political science, and related disciplines to interrogate how the European Union (EU) defines, governs, and is transformed by crises and emergencies. Against the backdrop of the Eurozone crisis, the migration crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and Russia’s war in Ukraine, the EU has increasingly been confronted with extraordinary events that test its constitutional foundations, governance mechanisms, and legitimacy. Yet despite the relevance of these events in the institutional and academic discourse, there remains no settled understanding of what qualifies as a ‘crisis’ or ‘emergency’, nor of how such labels shape institutional responses and longer-term integration trajectories.

The workshop opened with a keynote lecture by Professor Bruno de Witte (Maastricht University), who situated the debate in the broader legal context of EU emergency law. He underlined that, unlike many national systems, the EU Treaties provide no general emergency clause. Instead, the Union has relied on a scattered set of emergency competences and flexible interpretations of ordinary Treaty bases. In his view, emergency responses have demonstrated the EU’s capacity to adapt within the constraints of its legal order. This framing provided a point of reference for the four panels that followed, which explored how crises and emergencies are conceptualised, how they reshape governance structures, and how they are navigated in conditions of uncertainty.

The first explored the definitional boundaries of ‘crisis’ and ‘emergency’, revealing both disciplinary divergences and shared efforts to construct conceptual frameworks. The second examined how crises have reshaped the EU’s internal structures and external orientation, highlighting tensions between security, autonomy, and democratic legitimacy. The third turned to multilevel governance and emergency powers, tracing how regulation, financial autonomy, procurement mechanisms, and tacit states of exception transform the EU’s constitutional order. Finally, the fourth panel brought an epistemic perspective, foregrounding the role of institutions, individuals, and knowledge in navigating uncertainty.

The U.S. capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro represents a striking assertion of state power beyond established international norms. Seizing a foreign leader by military force, whether that leader’s legitimacy is disputed or not, without international authorization or lawful justification undermines the basic rules designed to restrain conflict and protect sovereignty, including those set out in the United Nations Charter. Such actions do not occur in isolation; they reflect a broader pattern in which governments increasingly treat legal constraints as optional when exercising power. ISSE examines this episode as an example of how the normalization of exceptional measures erodes accountability and weakens the legal guardrails that underpin both international order and democratic governance.

In late December 2025, renewed media attention turned to Centro de Confinamiento del Terrorism (CECOT), El Salvador’s flagship mega-prison, after CBS news executives postponed a 60 Minutes broadcast of an investigative report about the facility, called “Inside CECOT.” While the media controversy itself is newsworthy, the importance of the investigative report highlights another important reality: CECOT is not an anomaly or a temporary security measure, but a central institution of a state of exception that has now governed El Salvador for nearly four uninterrupted years. On December 22, 2025, American journalist Yashar Ali claimed to have obtained a video portion of the postponed investigative report, and published it on his Substack “The Reset.” Ali’s Substack, and the included video portion alleged to be part of the postponed 60 Minutes segment, is included here by ISSE for research and informational purposes only.

An accelerating trend toward unilateral executive action has characterized the post-Cold War American presidency. Confronted with intense partisan polarization and the resulting legislative stalemate, presidents have increasingly resorted to the tools of direct authority—executive orders, memoranda, and proclamations—to bypass a gridlocked Congress and enact their policy agendas.

The most potent tool is the declaration of a national emergency. This action unlocks a litany of latent statutory powers, allowing a president to redirect funds, deploy military personnel, and regulate sectors of the economy with minimal immediate oversight. This practice represents a fundamental shift in the locus of policymaking, moving it from the deliberative, legislative sphere to the decisive, executive one. 

The expanding use of presidential emergency powers is an effect of the secular decline of public faith in the nation’s core democratic institutions. Decades of data indicate that citizens are losing confidence in our constitutional system of checks and balances to address pressing problems. This loss of confidence suggests that citizens become more amenable to leaders who promise to cut through procedural constraints, thereby rewarding unilateralism and further eroding the norms of deliberative democracy. It creates a self-perpetuating cycle of distrust and overreach, in which each unilateral act delegitimizes the bypassed institutions, reinforcing public cynicism and increasing the political demand for executive action.