ISSE Explainer: The 2026 U.S. National Emergency Declaration on Cuba
On January 29, 2026, U.S. President Donald J. Trump signed an Executive Order titled “Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Cuba,” declaring that the current geopolitical dynamics involving Cuba constitute an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to U.S. national security and foreign policy, and as such further constitute a formal national emergency under the National Emergencies Act (NEA) and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)
Unlike traditional emergency declarations tied to military conflict or humanitarian crises, this one combines economic coercion with geopolitical pressure: it establishes a tariff system that allows the United States to impose additional duties on imports from any country that directly or indirectly supplies oil to Cuba as part of broader pressure on the Cuban regime.
Under Section 2 of the Executive Order, the U.S. will:
Task the Secretary of Commerce to determine whether a foreign country directly or indirectly sells or provides oil to Cuba;
If a finding is made, the Secretary of State and other Cabinet officials will recommend whether additional ad valorem tariffs should be imposed on goods imported into the United States from that country;
The President then decides the extent and application of those tariffs.
This tariff system, effectively a secondary economic sanction, is framed as a tool to deter foreign support for Cuba’s oil needs, pressing third-party states to curb energy ties with Havana.
In the declaration itself, the Trump administration articulates a wide range of national security concerns attributed to the Cuban government: Cuba’s alliances with Russia, China, Iran, and some non-state extremist groups (such as Hezbollah and Hamas); hosting of intelligence facilities and military cooperation with foreign adversaries; alleged obstruction of U.S. sanctions and destabilizing regional behaviors; and human-rights abuses and repression within Cuba. These claims are used to justify an emergency assertion, positioning Cuba as more than a foreign policy nuisance but as an active threat requiring extraordinary executive measures.
This emergency declaration and tariff tool are the latest in a series of hardline measures, including U.S. resumption of strict sanctions and diplomatic isolation of Cuba after a hiatus during earlier U.S.–Cuba rapprochement, Cuba being re-designated as a state sponsor of terrorism in 2025, and the U.S. military capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro earlier in 2026 which appears to have cut off a longtime source of oil for Cuba, deepening Havana’s energy crunch and creating leverage for pressure campaigns targeting Cuba’s remaining suppliers. In this light, the Cuba emergency declaration is as much an extension of pressure on Caribbean geopolitical alignments as it is a direct policy against Havana.
The invocation of NEA and IEEPA powers illustrate the continuing trend of presidents leveraging emergency economic authority for foreign policy objectives that extend beyond traditional immediate threats. Such actions raise complex questions about congressional oversight, checks and balances, and the expanding scope of executive tools in international affairs. Strategically, the tariff mechanism is less about direct confrontation with Cuba and more about coercing third-party states, particularly those with potential oil ties, to align with U.S. policy objectives. From a more macro perspective, targeted application of extraterritorial economic pressure effectively serves as an alternative to direct military or diplomatic engagement, where the assumption is that the former may be too much to use to solve the perceived problem, and the latter incapable or ineffective.
Longstanding Sanctions Authorities and Legal Continuity
It is also important to situate this declaration within the much longer legal history of U.S. sanctions on Cuba. Comprehensive economic restrictions on Cuba long predate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), having originally been imposed in the early 1960s under the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA). When IEEPA was enacted in 1977, most countries previously covered under TWEA were transitioned to the new statutory framework; Cuba, however, remained a unique exception, with its sanctions regime preserved through a series of presidential determinations and annual renewals. As a result, U.S. sanctions on Cuba today rest on a layered foundation of authorities—some predating IEEPA, others operating alongside it—illustrating how emergency economic powers, once invoked, can persist indefinitely through legal succession rather than formal termination.
The Broader Pattern of Serial Emergency Declarations
This declaration also fits within a broader and increasingly conspicuous pattern. With this Executive Order, the current administration appears to have invoked its thirteenth formal national emergency since being seated in January of 2025 (excluding the separate “crime” emergency declaration in the District of Columbia). While an attempt at justification for each proclamation has been consistently offered on their own terms, the cumulative effect is notable: national emergencies are no longer rare, exceptional responses to singular crises, but have become a recurring governance tool across disparate policy domains. From an ISSE perspective, this serial invocation matters as much as the substance of any individual order, reflecting how emergency authorities, once conceived as temporary and extraordinary, are now embedded in routine executive statecraft.
