This workshop brought together scholars of law, political science, and related disciplines to interrogate how the European Union (EU) defines, governs, and is transformed by crises and emergencies. Against the backdrop of the Eurozone crisis, the migration crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and Russia’s war in Ukraine, the EU has increasingly been confronted with extraordinary events that test its constitutional foundations, governance mechanisms, and legitimacy. Yet despite the relevance of these events in the institutional and academic discourse, there remains no settled understanding of what qualifies as a ‘crisis’ or ‘emergency’, nor of how such labels shape institutional responses and longer-term integration trajectories.

The workshop opened with a keynote lecture by Professor Bruno de Witte (Maastricht University), who situated the debate in the broader legal context of EU emergency law. He underlined that, unlike many national systems, the EU Treaties provide no general emergency clause. Instead, the Union has relied on a scattered set of emergency competences and flexible interpretations of ordinary Treaty bases. In his view, emergency responses have demonstrated the EU’s capacity to adapt within the constraints of its legal order. This framing provided a point of reference for the four panels that followed, which explored how crises and emergencies are conceptualised, how they reshape governance structures, and how they are navigated in conditions of uncertainty.

The first explored the definitional boundaries of ‘crisis’ and ‘emergency’, revealing both disciplinary divergences and shared efforts to construct conceptual frameworks. The second examined how crises have reshaped the EU’s internal structures and external orientation, highlighting tensions between security, autonomy, and democratic legitimacy. The third turned to multilevel governance and emergency powers, tracing how regulation, financial autonomy, procurement mechanisms, and tacit states of exception transform the EU’s constitutional order. Finally, the fourth panel brought an epistemic perspective, foregrounding the role of institutions, individuals, and knowledge in navigating uncertainty.

An accelerating trend toward unilateral executive action has characterized the post-Cold War American presidency. Confronted with intense partisan polarization and the resulting legislative stalemate, presidents have increasingly resorted to the tools of direct authority—executive orders, memoranda, and proclamations—to bypass a gridlocked Congress and enact their policy agendas.

The most potent tool is the declaration of a national emergency. This action unlocks a litany of latent statutory powers, allowing a president to redirect funds, deploy military personnel, and regulate sectors of the economy with minimal immediate oversight. This practice represents a fundamental shift in the locus of policymaking, moving it from the deliberative, legislative sphere to the decisive, executive one. 

The expanding use of presidential emergency powers is an effect of the secular decline of public faith in the nation’s core democratic institutions. Decades of data indicate that citizens are losing confidence in our constitutional system of checks and balances to address pressing problems. This loss of confidence suggests that citizens become more amenable to leaders who promise to cut through procedural constraints, thereby rewarding unilateralism and further eroding the norms of deliberative democracy. It creates a self-perpetuating cycle of distrust and overreach, in which each unilateral act delegitimizes the bypassed institutions, reinforcing public cynicism and increasing the political demand for executive action.

In the aftermath of Donald Trump’s return to the White House, a flurry of executive orders and memoranda has once again brought the concept of “national emergency” to the forefront of American governance. Within hours of taking office, the administration declared a “national emergency at the southern border,” villainized immigration, and raised the specter of a “border emergency” vaguely connected with a threat of “foreign terrorist organizations.” At first glance, these actions might resemble a continuation of tactics from Trump’s previous term, especially his 2019 declaration of a national emergency at the border. On closer inspection, however, the administration’s actions stretch well beyond traditional emergency contexts of national security or foreign policy, seeping into what were once ordinary spheres of domestic governance. Two separate executive orders, for example, both announce the existence of a “national energy emergency” and instruct relevant agencies to address the “emergency.” A separately presidential memorandum directed federal agencies to “deliver emergency price relief” by taking actions to reduce costs of housing, food, and fuel.  

In the United States, the military is not used for domestic law enforcement. That’s a bedrock civic principle, one that separates our democracy from dictatorships around the world. Our troops serve to protect the American people from harm coming from abroad, not to police people at home.

Legally speaking, though, there is one glaring exception: The Insurrection Act.