Lithuania’s Parliament Declares a State of Emergency Amid Hybrid Threat Concerns

On December 9, 2025, Lithuania formally declared a state of emergency following repeated incursions into its airspace by unmanned balloons launched from neighboring Belarus, which disrupted over 350 civilian flights since October. Lithuanian authorities have linked the balloon activity to organized smuggling networks and broader “hybrid” pressure tactics endorsed by Belarus’ President Alexander Lukashenko, citing risks to civil aviation, border security, and public safety. While the immediate trigger for the declaration appears unconventional, the legal response is constitutionally orthodox.

The declaration was not imposed by executive fiat. Instead, it was enacted by the Seimas, Lithuania’s legislature, through a formal parliamentary resolution. Under Article 144 of the Lithuanian Constitution, the Seimas holds primary authority to declare a state of emergency when threats arise to the constitutional order or public peace. The President may act only in urgent circumstances when parliament cannot convene, and even then, any such declaration must be promptly reviewed and approved by the Seimas.

Lithuania’s emergency framework is deliberately time-bound. By law, a state of emergency may remain in effect for no longer than six months unless renewed by a fresh parliamentary decision. The Seimas also determines the geographic scope of the emergency and the specific measures authorized, including the temporary involvement of military forces in support of civilian authorities, as is the case with this declaration. These constraints reflect a constitutional design intended to prevent the normalization or indefinite extension of exceptional powers.

The current emergency follows a pattern seen elsewhere along the European Union’s eastern flank, where governments increasingly frame security challenges—migration pressures, cyber incidents, infrastructure sabotage, or airspace violations—as components of hybrid warfare. In Lithuania’s case, officials argue that the scale and persistence of the balloon incursions exceed ordinary criminal activity and warrant the heightened state of exception. At the same time, this legal response remains embedded within ordinary constitutional procedures rather than suspended from them.

From a state of exception perspective, Lithuania’s approach is notable for what it does not do. The declaration does not suspend the constitution, does not empower the executive to legislate unilaterally, and does not remove parliamentary oversight. The Seimas retains the authority to amend, narrow, or revoke the emergency at any time. In contrast to systems where emergency powers migrate toward the executive and become self-renewing, Lithuania’s model keeps the legislature at the center of decision-making.

Whether this emergency remains temporary or evolves into a recurring governance tool will depend less on the immediate security threat than on institutional practice over time. For now, Lithuania offers a contemporary example of a state confronting novel security pressures while preserving legislative control over exceptional measures. As debates over emergency governance continue across democratic systems, this case highlights the importance of who declares an emergency, and under what constraints, as much as why it is declared in the first place.

Photo by Justina Pakalnytė on Unsplash.