Why Does Backsliding Depth Vary? Legal Populism, Abusive Constitutionalism, and the Differential Trajectories of Democratic Erosion in Hungary and Poland
Why Does Backsliding Depth Vary? Legal Populism, Abusive Constitutionalism, and the Differential Trajectories of Democratic Erosion in Hungary and Poland
Journal: Politics in Central Europe. Politics in Central Europe is an open access, independent and internationally peer-reviewed scientific journal in political science and international relations. The journal was established in 2005 in the cooperation with the Central European Political Science Association (CEPSA). Politics in Central Europe publishes original, peer-reviewed manuscripts focusing on issues in comparative politics, policy analysis, political theory, international relations, security studies, regional studies and other sub-disciplines of political science, as well as original theoretical or conceptual analyses. More on the journal can be found here.
Date of Publication: July 27, 2026.
Authors: Ahmed Benaidja and Ali Bakchiche
Ahmed Benaidja is a researcher in the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Laghouat, Algeria. His research interests include comparative politics, democratic transitions, constitutionalism, governance, political institutions, and political development in North Africa and Central and Eastern Europe. He has participated in several national and international scientific conferences and has published research on democratization, constitutional reforms, and comparative political systems. E‑mail: a.benaidja@lagh‑univ.dz; ORCID: 00090009-4806-3629.
Ali Bakchiche is a Full Professor of Political Science at the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Laghouat, Algeria. His research focuses on public policy, governance, political institutions, state‑building processes, and comparative politics. He has supervised numerous academic research projects and contributed to national and international scholarly publications ad‑ dressing political development, institutional reform, and governance challenges in contemporary states. E‑mail: a.bakchiche@lagh‑univ.dz.
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Abstract: Why did democratic backsliding reach fundamentally different depths in Hungary and Poland, two states that shared comparable institutional legacies, European Union membership and right-wing populist governments? This article argues that existing comparative accounts – centred on executive aggrandisement and electoral authoritarianism – are insufficient to explain this variation, because they overlook the decisive role of constitutional design and the specific legal strategy adopted by each governing party. Drawing on a novel analytical synthesis of 'abusive constitutionalism', 'legal populism' and 'stealth authoritarianism', the article demonstrates that Hungary's supermajority enabled a comprehensive constitutional overhaul that irreversibly restructured the conditions of political competition, whilst Poland's institutional architecture and fragmented opposition preserved sufficient democratic resilience to allow electoral reversal in 2023. The article further engages V-Dem longitudinal data (2010–2024) to trace the divergent trajectories empirically, and evaluates the EU's rule-of-law enforcement evolution across three phases: rhetorical condemnation, Article 7 proceedings and financial conditionality. The findings advance a 'constitutional threshold' theory of backsliding depth, with implications for comparative democratisation and EU institutional design.
Why ISSE Is Recommending This Article: This article offers a thoughtful comparative analysis of why democratic backsliding has produced different constitutional outcomes in Hungary and Poland despite important structural similarities. Building on concepts such as abusive constitutionalism, legal populism, and executive aggrandizement, the authors argue that the depth of democratic erosion depends not only on political leadership but also on the constitutional architecture within which executive power operates. Particularly valuable is the article's emphasis on how constitutional design, institutional resilience, and the strategic use of legal mechanisms shape the long-term trajectory of democratic governance. While some of its theoretical innovations remain open to further testing, the article provides a useful framework for thinking about constitutional resilience, institutional capture, and the conditions under which exceptional concentrations of executive authority become difficult to reverse.
