Deference Should Follow Expertise, Not Pretext: Anthropic v. Department of War and the Case for Squaring Trump v. Hawaii with Department of Commerce v. New York - Just Security

Deference Should Follow Expertise, Not Pretext: Anthropic v. Department of War and the Case for Squaring Trump v. Hawaii with Department of Commerce v. New York

Source: Just Security

Date of Publication: August 12, 2026

Author: Yuvraj S. Tuli. Yuvraj S. Tuli (LinkedIn) is a Research Fellow at the Institute for the Study of States of Exception. His research focuses on judicial review and the separation of powers, with scholarship appearing in the Yale Journal on Regulation and International Journal of Constitutional Law. Previously, he served as Editor-in-Chief of the Cornell Undergraduate International Law Review and was on the Editorial Board of the LSE Law Review. He holds a B.A. in Government with honors and distinction from Cornell University and studied public law at the London School of Economics as a visiting student. In fall 2026, he will begin an MPhil at the University of Cambridge.

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Summary of the Article: This article examines the growing tension between judicial deference to executive claims of national security and the courts' responsibility to ensure that such claims are not used as a pretext for unrelated political objectives. Using the federal litigation surrounding Anthropic v. Department of War as its principal case study, ISSE Research Fellow Yuvraj Tuli argues that courts should distinguish between genuine operational security judgments, which warrant substantial deference, and the use of national security authorities to impose legal sanctions unrelated to legitimate security concerns. Drawing on Trump v. Hawaii and Department of Commerce v. New York, the article proposes a framework under which judicial deference follows demonstrated expertise rather than the mere invocation of national security.

Why We Are Recommending This Article: This article examines an increasingly important question for constitutional governance: how courts should evaluate executive actions taken in the name of national security without undermining the executive's legitimate responsibility to protect the nation. It explores the distinction between bona fide security judgments and the use of national security authorities as a pretext for pursuing unrelated political or administrative objectives. By proposing a doctrinal framework that ties judicial deference to genuine expertise rather than simply accepting security-related justifications at face value, the article contributes to broader debates about accountability, separation of powers, and the appropriate judicial role in reviewing exceptional executive authority.