Trump 47 and the Judicial Burdens of Presidential Unilateralism
Journal Article: Trump 47 and the Judicial Burdens of Presidential Unilateralism
Journal: PS: Political Science & Politics, which is a premier outlet featuring timely and original research on a variety of topics that are relevant to political scientists and researchers in allied fields. More on this journal can be found here.
Date of Publication: April 13, 2026
Author: Jasmine Farrier. Farrier is a professor of Political Science at the University of Louisville and directs the UofL-Frankfort Legislative Internship Program. She graduated from the University of Wisconsin-Madison (BA, Political Science) and University of Texas at Austin (PhD, Government). Before joining the UofL faculty, Farrier was a fellow with the Miller Center at the University of Virginia. Prof. Farrier's research and teaching span all three branches of the US government, with a focus on separation of powers development, institutional reform, constitutional conflicts, and congressional delegation of power. More on Farrier can found here.
How to Cite: Farrier J. Trump 47 and the Judicial Burdens of Presidential Unilateralism. PS: Political Science & Politics. Published online 2026:1-10. doi:10.1017/S1049096526101899
Abstract: In 2025, President Donald Trump expanded his own powers through unprecedented interpretations of congressional statutes and Article II of the US Constitution. Ensuing waves of litigation and a record number of emergency-relief applications by the administration to the US Supreme Court placed extraordinary pressure on the federal judiciary. Although US district judges have delayed or halted a range of significant administrative actions, this article’s overview of Trump 47 in court highlights three different scholarly approaches that doubt that the US Supreme Court alone can or ultimately will reverse the administration’s agenda. First, the Roberts Court’s emergency docket decisions thus far comport with recent polarization trends in presidential-power cases. Second, the US Supreme Court lacks institutional capacity and consistent jurisprudence to challenge each area of alleged presidential overreach. Third, the administration’s use of broad authorities previously delegated by Congress serves as a reminder that constitutional interpretation and executive-branch powers are rooted in the broader political system. Congress cannot easily retract granted authority but curtailing presidential unilateralism requires more than litigation.
